On How Speaker's and Participant's Viewpoints Function in Japanese

—A cognitive approach to the reflexive *jibun*—

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Abstract

Previous work such as Kuno (1976) has analyzed Japanese sentences with the reflexive *jibun* in terms of the speaker's empathy assigned to a particular participant in an event.

Pointing out that there are examples whose well-formedness cannot be properly accounted for solely with the notion of empathy, this paper proposes an alternative approach. The major claims are that the use of Japanese reflexive *jibun* is motivated by the mental transfer (Langacker 1987, 1991) of the speaker's Viewpoint (Cutrer 1994; Fauconnier 1997) and the mental rotation (Shepard & Metzler 1971), and that the mental transfer is caused by a high degree (as opposed to the highest degree) of the speaker's empathy with a participant in an event. Also, it is argued that when *jibun* is used, the process of the speaker's construal of the event reflects a basic human cognitive ability, reference-point ability (Langacker 1993; Yamanashi 2000).

In order to validate the claims and argument, this paper demonstrates the following: 1) the acceptability of examples not accounted for in Kuno's theory can be explained easily by proposing that the speaker's/narrator's highest degree of empathy motivates the blending (Fauconnier and Turner 1996) of the two Viewpoints; 2) The well-formedness or the opposite of sentences with the verbs of giving *kureru* and *yaru* can be explained using a unified notion of Viewpoint, if the centripetal and the non-centripetal properties of the verbs in relation to the locus of the speaker's Viewpoint are stipulated.

Keywords: reflexive, empathy, mental transfer, Viewpoint, mental rotation, reference-point ability, blending

0. Introduction

There are now quite a number of studies of the Japanese reflexive *jibun* (self). They include studies based on formalistic approaches such as Kuroda (1973), Inoue (1976) and Nakamura (1989) and, more relevant to this paper, functionalist-cognitive approaches such as Kuno (1976, 1987), Kuno and Kaburaki (1977) and Sawada (1993). It is with these cognitively oriented approaches that we will be concerned in this paper.

Kuno, and Kuno and Kaburaki characterize *jibun* as empathy expressions. They argue, for example, that when the reflexive *jibun* is used to refer to a participant in an event in a complex sentence such as (1) with its antecedent not in the same simplex sentence that it is in, the speaker empathizes and identifies himself with the participant, i.e., *Hanako* in this example (indices are put to show that indexed NPs are coreferential. And the solid line arrow that runs from *jibun* to *Hanako* shows that the speaker, by using *jibun*, empathizes with *Hanako*):

(1) Hanako$_i$ wa Taroo ga jibun$_i$ ni kyuukonshita hi ni kaisya wo yamete shimatta.
Hanako-top. Taroo-sub. self-dat. proposed day on company-obj. quitting ended-up
Hanako$_i$ quit her job the day Taroo proposed to her$_i$. (Kuno 1976)

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As this example shows, the main feature of Kuno's theory is to use the notion of empathy to analyze various linguistic phenomena. But there are examples whose well-formedness cannot be accounted for solely with the notion of empathy, which will be presented in a moment.

In this paper, I will propose an alternative approach. My approach is based on the assumption that empathy is a motivation or a trigger for the functions of Viewpoint and that linguistic phenomena should be treated in terms of them. I will demonstrate that my approach accounts neatly for problematic examples for Kuno's theory. Also, I will clarify what kind of Viewpoint function is involved in the use of *jibun* in a complex sentence.(1) Finally, I will argue that when *jibun* is used, the process of the speaker's construal of the event reflects a basic human cognitive ability, reference-point ability.

First, let us see in detail how Kuno's empathy theory explains sentences with *jibun*.

1. Analysis based on the speaker's empathy

Consider sentences in (2). According to Kuno (1987), (2a), which has a pronoun *kare* (him), is a sentence in which the speaker gives an objective description of what happened by placing himself at a distance from *Yamada*. It follows from the position of the speaker's point of view in his uttering this sentence that the use of the pronoun such as *kare* shows that the speaker does not express his empathy with the referent of its antecedent (the dotted line arrow indicates that when the pronoun is used, the speaker's empathy is not with the topic NP). In contrast, (2b) is characterized as one in which the speaker has overtly expressed his high degree of empathy with *Yamada* (the solid line arrow indicates that the speaker, by using the reflexive, assigns empathy to the referent of the topic NP):

(2) a. Yamada$_i$ wa, *kare*$_i$ wo nikunde iru onna to kekkonshite shimatta.
Yamada-top. him-obj. hating is woman with marrying end up
Yamada$_i$ ended up marrying a woman who hated him$_i$.

b. Yamada$_i$ wa, *jibun*$_i$ wo nikunde iru onna to kekkonshite shimatta. (Kuno 1987)
Yamada-top. self-obj. hating is woman with marrying end up
Yamada$_i$ ended up marrying a woman who hated him$_i$.

According to Kuno (1987), (2b) ordinarily implies at the time of its utterance that *Yamada* is aware that the woman he married hated him. Kuno (1976) argues that when *jibun* is used in a subordinate clause and the referent of its antecedent is aware of the action or state represented by that clause, the speaker assigns the highest degree of empathy, and thus self-identification, to the referent. Thus, in (2b), the speaker empathizes with *Yamada* to the highest degree and totally identifies with him.

Let us consider next example (3):

(3) Taroo$_i$ wa Hanako ga jibun$_i$ wo aishite iru koto o shiranai.
Taroo-top. Hanako-sub. self-obj. loving is that don't know
Taroo$_i$ doesn't know that Hanako is in love with him$_i$. (Kuno 1976)

We know from (3) that *Taroo* is not aware that *Hanako* loves him. According to Kuno's empathy theory, the speaker of (3) empathizes with *Taroo* not to the highest degree and thus only partially identifies with him. Based on examples like (2b) and (3), Kuno argues that the speaker's empathy varies in degree in *jibun* sentences.

Kuno (1976), and Kuno and Kaburaki (1977) also characterize verbs of giving *kureru* and *yaru* as showing similar empathy characteristics to *jibun*. Kuno proposes the principle shown in (4) regarding the choice between these two verbs:

(4) *Kureru* requires that the speaker's empathy be placed on the referent of its dative object, and *yaru* that his empathy be placed on the referent of its subject. (Kuno 1976 : 254)

The introduction of the verbs of giving *kureru* and *yaru* into *jibun* sentences makes the contrast in the assignment of empathy caused by the use of the pronoun or the reflexive distinct. Let us consider examples in (5) :



(5) a. Tanaka-san $_i$ wa [Doi-san ga kare $_i$ ni hon wo *kureta/yatta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
Mr. Tanaka-top. Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
Mr. Tanaka $_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him $_i$ a book.



b. Tanaka-san $_i$ wa [Doi-san ga jibun $_i$ ni hon wo kureta/*yatta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
Mr. Tanaka-top. Ms. Doi-sub. self-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
Mr. Tanaka $_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him $_i$ a book.



c. Boku no otooto $_i$ wa [Doi-san ga jibun $_i$ ni hon wo kureta/*yatta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
my brother-top. Ms. Doi-sub. self-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
My brother $_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him $_i$ a book.

Kuno's empathy theory accounts for these examples straightforwardly. As just discussed in (2a), the use of *kare* (him) in (5a) shows that the speaker's empathy is not with the referent of its antecedent, that is, *Tanaka -san* (Mr. Tanaka). The dotted line arrow indicates this. As stipulated in the principle in (4), the use of *kureta* shows that the speaker's empathy is placed on the referent of the dative object, that is, the same *Tanaka-san* rather than on that of the subject. The solid line arrow from *kureta* indicates this. Therefore, the use of *kare* and *kureta* causes a contradiction regarding the empathy assignment. Thus, *kureta* cannot be used in this sentence. The sign of lightning between two arrows shows the contradiction. In contrast, the use of *yatta* indicates that the speaker's empathy is placed on the referent of the subject rather than on that of the dative object. So, neither *kare* nor *yatta* marks *Tanaka-san* with empathy. Since there is no contradiction regarding the empathy assignment, *yatta* can be used in this sentence.

In (5b), the use of *jibun* and the use of *kureta* are compatible because they both indicate the presence of empathy to *Tanaka-san*. Thus, there is no contradiction. So this sentence is well-formed. On the other hand, the use of *yatta* indicates that the speaker's empathy is not with *Tanaka-san*, whereas the use of *jibun* indicates the presence of the speaker's empathy to the same person. Since this causes a contradiction regarding the empathy assignment, *yatta* cannot be used in this sentence. (5c) can be explained in the same way as (5b). So far, so good. Let us consider next the sentences in (6) :

(6) a. Doi-san ga boku ni hon wo kureta.
Ms. Doi-sub. me-dat. book-obj. gave
Ms. Doi gave me a book.

b. Doi-san ga Maeda-san to iu hito ni hon wo *kureta/yatta.
Ms. Doi-sub. a Mr. Maeda-dat. book-obj. gave
Ms. Doi gave a Mr. Maeda a book.

c. Doi-san ga kare (=boku no otooto) ni hon wo kureta.
Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave
Ms. Doi gave him a book.

Note from (6a) and (6b) that the dative object of the verb *kureta* is normally the first-person pronoun but not the third-person. But (6c), in which the third-person pronoun *kare* that refers to *boku no otooto* is the dative object of *kureta*, is perfectly OK in the context where the dative object is something that belongs to the speaker (Kuno 1973) or something closely affiliated with the speaker (Iwasaki 1993) or the in-group member of the speaker (Wetzel 1985) and also *Doi-san*'s (Ms. Doi's) having given a book to the speaker's brother is considered by the speaker to be beneficial to himself in some way or other as well as to his brother. Let us consider example (7), keeping (6c) in mind.

Kuno's empathy theory runs into trouble when it tries to account for the well-formedness of (7):



(7) Boku no otooto $_i$ wa [Doi-san ga kare $_i$ ni hon wo kureta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
my brother-top. Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
My brother $_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him $_i$ a book.

In this example, *kureta*, which shows that the speaker's empathy is with *boku no otooto* (my brother), and *kare*, which indicates that the empathy is not placed on *boku no otooto* are used. Under Kuno's analysis, the use of *kureta* and *kare* in the same sentence causes a contradiction regarding the empathy assignment and thus (7) has to be unacceptable. However, this sentence is perfectly acceptable because its embedded clause is well-formed as observed in (6c). Sawada (1993) gives similar examples such as (8), in which giving verbs are used as supporting verbs, coupled with main verbs:

(8) Boku no imooto $_i$ wa [Mary ga kinoo kanojo $_i$ ni oshiete kureta] sonnet wo itsumo ansyou shite iru.
my sister-top. Mary-sub. yesterday her-dat. taught sonnet-obj. always reciting
My sister $_i$ is always reciting the sonnet that Mary taught her $_i$ yesterday. (Sawada 1993)

Kuno's theory cannot explain examples like (8) properly, either.

It is thus impossible to explain the acceptability of the above examples in a consistent way in terms of speaker empathy and speaker identification with a participant.

The problem is that Kuno wrongly assumes that the speaker expresses his highest degree of empathy and thus total identification with the referent of *jibun*, when, as in (2b), he is aware of the action or state represented by the clause in which *jibun* appears. I claim that a high degree (but not the highest degree) of the speaker's empathy with a participant is required regardless of the awareness of the referent of *jibun*.

I would assume that the speaker's highest degree of empathy, total identification is instead involved in cases such as (7) and (8) but not in cases like (2b) as proposed by Kuno.

It has been made clear that there are examples that the notion of empathy cannot deal with properly.

The following section will demonstrate that the introduction of the concept of Viewpoint and its functions within the framework of Mental Space Theory accounts neatly for both the ill-formedness and the well-formedness of the above examples.

2. Analysis based on Viewpoint and its functions

2. 1. Viewpoint and its functions in Mental Space Theory

According to Cutrer (1994), Viewpoint is the center of conceptualization and consciousness of the self to whom an utterance is attributed. It is composed of deictic dimensions such as time and space. In order to analyze the above sentences properly, I would propose three ways in which Viewpoint functions:

(a) The speaker's Viewpoint and the participant's Viewpoint can be blended.
(b) Viewpoint can shift from the speaker to a participant and vice versa.
(c) The speaker's Viewpoint can be transferred to the Viewpoint locus of a participant.



Figure 1

The functions of Viewpoint can be roughly schematized as in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the circle objects symbolize the Viewpoint. Figure (1a) shows that due to blending, the speaker's black Viewpoint and the participant's white Viewpoint are merged or fused into a new gray one. As a result, sentences formed with this blended Viewpoint reflect some merged features of the original two Viewpoints. So, in sentences formed under this function, it is difficult to distinguish clearly which part reflects the speaker's Viewpoint and which the participant's Viewpoint. Figure (1b) shows that the Viewpoint has shifted from the speaker to a participant and vice versa. As a result, sentences formed with this function show clearly a shift between the part in which the speaker's Viewpoint is 100% reflected and another part in which the participant's Viewpoint is 100% reflected. So the parts that reflect the speaker's Viewpoint and the participant's Viewpoint can be clearly distinguished. Figure (1c) shows that the speaker is placing himself in the Viewpoint position of the participant. As a result, sentences formed by this function solely reflect the speaker's Viewpoint, even though readers or hearers of these sentences may perceive them as the reflection of the participant's Viewpoint. I claim that that perception is caused by the speaker's mental transfer of the Viewpoint to the locus of the Viewpoint of the participant. The speaker is construing the event as if from the participant's Viewpoint :

Table 1

Degrees of Speaker empathy	Functions of Viewpoint motivated by each empathy degree
Highest degree of empathy (=total identification)	Blending of the speaker's Viewpoint and the participant's Viewpoint : [function (a)]
High degree of empathy	Mental transfer of the speaker's Viewpoint to the locus of the participant's Viewpoint : [function (c)] → the use of *jibun*
Lowest degree of empathy (=total lack of empathy)	No mental transfer of the speaker's Viewpoint → the use of the pronoun

Here, as an assumption for the argument following, let us stipulate the relationship between the three levels of the speaker's empathy with a participant in an event and the functions of Viewpoint caused by them. In Table 1, three levels of the speaker's empathy are put in the left column and the corresponding functions of Viewpoint are listed in the right column. For example, the table shows that the highest degree of the speaker's empathy causes the blending of the speaker's Viewpoint and the participant's Viewpoint : I have included the shift between the speaker's Viewpoint and the participant's Viewpoint as one of the functions of Viewpoint for later discussions. However, this function is not included in the table because the shift in Viewpoint does not have to be characterized in terms of the speaker's empathy.

2. 2. An alternative analysis

It is the mental transfer motivated by the speaker's high degree of empathy that accounts for his use of *jibun*. Also, I would like to propose that the verbs of giving *kureru* and *yaru* have the centripetal feature (the word *centripetal* literally means "proceeding or acting in a direction toward a center or axis") and the non-centripetal feature respectively in relation to the position of the speaker's Viewpoint as shown in (9) :

(9) *Kureru* requires that a gift move toward the speaker's Viewpoint, and *yaru* that a gift not move toward the speaker's Viewpoint.



(a) kureru centripetal feature (b) *yaru* non-centripetal feature

Figure 2

These features are roughly schematized as in Figure 2 (a) and Figure 2 (b) :
The reason I use the term non-centripetal instead of using the term centrifugal is that there are two patterns that the verb *yaru* requires regarding the direction of the movement of a gift as shown in Figure 2 (b).

Now, let us first observe how this Viewpoint analysis simply accounts for the well-formedness or opposite of the sentences with *kureru* or *yaru*. Let us consider examples in (10) :

(10) a. Saga-san ga watashi ni hon wo kureta.
Mr. Saga-sub. me-dat. book-obj. gave
Mr. Saga gave me a book.

b. *Watashi wa Saga-san ni hon wo kureta.
I-top. Mr. Saga-dat. book-obj. gave
I gave Mr. Saga a book.

c. Watashi wa Saga-san ni hon wo yatta.
I-top. Mr. Saga-dat. book-obj. gave
I gave Mr. Saga a book.

d. *Saga-san ga watashi ni hon wo yatta.
Mr. Saga-sub. me-dat. book-obj. gave
Mr. Saga gave me a book.

In (10a), the gift *hon* (book) moves toward *watashi* (me), i.e., the speaker. The speaker has the Viewpoint. Thus (10a) is grammatical. On the other hand, in (10b), the gift moves away from the speaker's Viewpoint, which violates the centripetal feature of the verb *kureru*. Thus the use of *kureta* makes this

sentence ungrammatical. In (10c), the gift moves away from the speaker's Viewpoint, which satisfies the non-centripetal feature of the verb *yaru*. Thus this sentence is grammatical. On the other hand, in (10d), the gift moves toward the speaker's Viewpoint, which contradicts the non-centripetal feature of the verb *yaru*. Hence the ungrammaticality of (10d). Let us consider next (5) and (7) repeated here as (11) and (12), again :

(11) a. Tanaka-san$_i$ wa [Doi-san ga kare$_i$ ni hon wo *kureta/yatta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
Mr. Tanaka-top. Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
Mr. Tanaka$_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him$_i$ a book.
b. Tanaka-san$_i$ wa [Doi-san ga jibun$_i$ ni hon wo kureta/*yatta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
Mr. Tanaka-top. Ms. Doi-sub. self-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
Mr. Tanaka$_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him$_i$ a book.
c. Boku no otooto$_i$ wa [Doi-san ga jibun$_i$ ni hon wo kureta/*yatta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
my brother-top. Ms. Doi-sub. self-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
My brother$_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him$_i$ a book.

(12) Boku no otooto$_i$ wa [Doi-san ga kare$_i$ ni hon wo kureta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
my brother-top. Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
My brother$_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him$_i$ a book.

In (11a), the use of *kare* as opposed to *jibun* indicates that the speaker's Viewpoint is not mentally transferred in space to *Tanaka-san*'s Viewpoint locus. Thus, the gift *hon* moves toward the participant's, i.e., *Tanaka-san*'s Viewpoint but not toward the speaker's Viewpoint. Therefore, *yatta* can be used, whereas *kureta* cannot be used in this example. On the other hand, in (11b), since *jibun* is used, the speaker's Viewpoint is mentally transferred to *Tanaka-san*'s Viewpoint locus. So, the movement of *hon* toward *Tanaka-san*'s Viewpoint position means its movement toward the speaker's Viewpoint. Thus, not *yatta* but *kureta*, which requires that the gift move toward the speaker's Viewpoint has to be used. (11c) can be explained in the same way as (11b).

Let's move on to (12). At first glance, (12) seems problematic in that the use of *kare* which indicates no mental transfer of the speaker's Viewpoint contradicts the use of *kureta* which shows that *hon* moves toward the speaker's Viewpoint. This phenomenon cannot be explained by Kuno's empathy analysis as we have seen above. But the assumption that in this example, the speaker empathizes with *boku no otooto* to the highest degree and thus totally identifies with him, together with the blending of the speaker's and the participant's Viewpoints account neatly for the well-formedness of this sentence. Now let us have a closer look at the concept of blending.

2. 3. Blending

Fauconnier and Turner (1996), and a number of others propose the existence of a general cognitive process, conceptual blending. Blending operates on two input mental spaces to yield a separate space, the blended space. In blending, structure and elements from two input spaces is partially projected to the blended space. As a result, the blended space inherits partial structure and elements from the input spaces, and it also develops an emergent structure of its own.

One example of blending can be seen in the fact that we are able to talk about particular computer programs and various related phenomena in the computer field by using expressions in the field of health.

Consider the examples in (13) :

(13) a. Uirusu de ookuno kanja ga shinda.
virus because of many patients-sub. died
The virus killed many patients.
b. Yuugaina puroguramu de ookuno fairu ga kowareta.
harmful program because of many files-sub. broke
The harmful program destroyed many files.

c. Uirusu de ookuno fairu ga shinda.
virus because of many files-sub. died
The virus destroyed many files.

Words such as *uirusu* (virus), *kanja* (patients) and *shinu* (die) in (13a) are all considered to be expressions in the field of health. Words such as *yuugaina puroguramu* (harmful program), *fairu* (files) and *kowareru* (break) in (13b) are expressions in the field of computers. Blending makes it possible for us to construct a sentence like (13c) when we describe the same event represented normally as in (13b).

Fauconnier (1997) gives some of the conditions that are satisfied when two input spaces are blended. Let us use the above examples in (13) to see how the conditions (A)-(D) below are satisfied :

(A) CROSS-SPACE MAPPING : There is a partial mapping of counterparts between the input spaces as shown in Figure 3. (Since we are dealing with examples at a construction level here, mappings are established between all the corresponding elements.) For example, *uirusu* and *kanja* in the health domain are mapped onto *yuugaina puroguramu* and *fairu* in the computer domain respectively. The notation "**a** no tame ni, shinu **b** (because of **a**, die **b**)" in the left square in Figure 3 means that because of element **a**, element **b** dies. Similar notations will be used for other examples :

(B) GENERIC SPACE : We can abstract the generic schemata from both domains. When we do this, we build a space called generic space, whose elements map onto elements of each input space. This space reflects some common, usually more abstract, structure and organization shared by the input spaces as in Figure 4.

For example, we abstract the schema of a harmful substance from **a** and **a'**, and the schema of a damaged substance from **b** and **b'**. Also, we abstract the schema of a frame "**a"** no tame ni, sonshou o ukeru **b"** (because of **a"**, **b"** suffers damage)" from the frames "**a** no tame ni, shinu **b** (because of **a**, die **b**)" and "**a'** no tame ni, kowareru **b'** (because of **a'**, break **b'**)" :



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5

(C) BLEND : The existence of the generic space enables us to partially map elements or structure from both input spaces into the blended space, as shown in Figure 5. When counterparts are projected into the blended space, they may be fused into a single element or they may be projected separately or one of the counterparts is projected but not the other.

In Figure 5, both element **a'''** and element **b'''** are the examples of one of the counterparts (uirusu (virus) / fairu (files)) being projected but not the other (kanja (patients) / yuugaina puroguramu (harmful program)), which are shown by broken lines :

(D) EMERGENT STRUCTURE : The blend space has new internal structure not provided by the elements in input spaces. The structure of the blended space in Figure 5 is the emergent structure per se because the projections from the input spaces, i.



Figure 6

e., elements **a'''** and **b'''** and the frame "**a'''** no tame ni, shinu **b'''** (because of **a'''**, die **b'''**)", taken together, make new relations available only in this blended space that did not exist in the separate input spaces.

Schematically, the whole process so far is represented as in Figure 6 :

In Figure 6, a dotted line arrow from the frame "**a** no tame ni, shinu **b** (because of **a**, die **b**)" to the frame "**a'''** no tame ni, shinu **b'''** (because of **a'''**, die **b'''**)" shows that a schema of a frame in input space 1 (as opposed to input space 2) is projected to the internal structure of the blended space.

Now, let us consider (12), repeated here as (14) again :

(14) Boku no otooto $_i$ wa [Doi-san ga kare $_i$ ni hon wo kureta toki] ooyorokobi shita.
my brother-top. Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave when delighted
My brother $_i$ was delighted when Ms. Doi gave him $_i$ a book.

As mentioned earlier, let us assume that when the speaker utters this sentence, he expresses his highest degree of empathy and thus totally identifies himself with his brother. The total identification of the speaker and his brother naturally results in the fusion or the blending of the speaker's Viewpoint and his brother's Viewpoint.

Now I will demonstrate that the application of the concept of blending to the Viewpoint easily explains the acceptability of this sentence by examining how it satisfies the conditions of blending (A)-(D).

Doi-san's giving a book to the speaker's brother can be described as in (15a) from the brother's Viewpoint (Base/Viewpoint space, technically speaking) and as in (15b) from the speaker's Viewpoint without his empathizing with his brother to the highest degree and totally identifying with him :

(15) a. Doi-san ga watashi ni hon wo kureta.
Ms. Doi-sub. me-dat. book-obj. gave
Ms. Doi gave me a book.
b. Doi-san ga kare (= boku no otooto) ni hon wo yatta.
Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave
Ms. Doi gave him a book.

Let us examine how the conditions of blending (A) -(D) are satisfied to verify that (14) is structured as the result of the blending of two Viewpoints :

(A) CROSS-SPACE MAPPING : Between the spaces set up by (15a) and (15b), *Doi-san* (Ms. Doi), *watashi* (me) and *hon* (book) are mapped onto their counterparts as shown in Figure 6. The notation "kureru **a**, **b** ni **c** wo (give **a**, **b** **c**)" in the Figure means that element **a** (=giver) gives element **b** (=recipient) element **c** (=gift). Similar notations will be used for other examples :

(B) GENERIC SPACE : In Figure 6, these two input spaces share frame structure : there is a giver, a recipient, a gift and a relationship in which the gift



Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8

moves from the giver to the recipient. This shared frame structure constitutes a third space, a generic space as in Figure 7. The notation "idou suru **c"**, **a"** kara **b"** e (move **c"**, from **a"** to **b"**)" means that element **c"** moves from element **a"** to element **b"**:

(C) BLEND : The existence of the generic space enables us to partially map elements or structure from both input spaces into the blended space. When counterparts are projected into the blended space, they may be fused into a single element or one of the counterparts is projected but not the other. Figure 8 shows that elements **a'"** and **c'"** are cases in which the counterparts are fused into a single element, which is represented by two dotted lines, and that element **b'"** is the one in which one of the counterparts---i.e., *kare* (=*boku no otooto* (my younger brother))---is projected, which is represented by a broken line. A dotted line arrow from the frame "kureru **a**, **b** ni **c** o (give **a**, **b c**)" in input space 1 to the frame "kureru **a'"**, **b'"** ni **c'"** wo (give **a'"**, **b'" c'"**)" in the blended space shows that the schema of the frame in the internal structure of input space 1 (as opposed to input space 2) is projected to the internal structure of the blended space:

(D) EMERGENT STRUCTURE : The blended space has a new internal structure not provided by the elements in the two input spaces. The structure of the blended space in Figure 8 is the emergent structure per se because the projections from the input spaces---i.e., elements **a'"**, **b'"** and **c'"** ---and the frame "kureru **a'"**, **b'"** ni **c'"** wo (give **a'"**, **b'" c'"**)", taken together, make new relations available only in this blended space that did not exist in the separate input spaces.

As a result of the above process, the description of the same event from the blended Viewpoint space is shown in (16), which indeed reflects the blending of the syntactic structures (15a) and (15b). Conversely, the blended syntactic structure is developed by a cognitive operation: the blending of two Viewpoints:

(16) Doi-san ga kare (=boku no otooto) ni hon wo kureta.
Ms. Doi-sub. him-dat. book-obj. gave
Ms. Doi gave him a book.

Since (16) is acceptable, the sentence (14)(=(12) =(7)), in which (16) is embedded, is quite acceptable.

It follows from what has been said that the speaker's highest degree of empathy with a participant, empathy leading to his total identification is not what motivates the use of *jibun*. This degree of empathy brings about the blending of the speaker's Viewpoint and the participant's Viewpoint. We may say that the grammaticality of the sentences such as (14)(=(12) =(7)), in which (16) is embedded, and (8) above can be adequately explained if Viewpoint is taken into account. I have also shown that acceptability and unacceptability of sentences with the verbs of giving *kureru* and *yaru* can be explained using Viewpoint rather than empathy, if we stipulate centripetal feature in relation to the locus of the speaker's Viewpoint.

Let us consider next the pair in (17):

(17) a. Takeshi $_i$ wa [Ai ga jibun $_i$ wo nikunde iru koto wo shitte] kanashii.
Takeshi-top. Ai-sub. self-obj. hating is that know sad
Takeshi $_i$ is sad to know that Ai hates him $_i$.
b. Takeshi $_i$ wa [Ai ga jibun $_i$ wo nikunde iru koto wo shitte] kanashi soo da.
Takeshi-top. Ai-sub. self-obj. hating is that know sad it seems to me
It seems to me that Takeshi $_i$ is sad to know that Ai hates him $_i$.

If *jibun* could reflect the speaker's highest degree of empathy when its referent's awareness exists, we could expect (17a) to be acceptable in any context. However, (17a) is possible only in narrative because, unlike (17b), it lacks any evidential or inferential markers representing the speaker's subjective judgement.

The reason for the acceptability of (17a) in narrative is that in narrative, the implied author, who is omniscient, can make the narrator empathize with *Takeshi* to the highest degree and thus totally identify with him. This total identification causes the blending of the two Viewpoints. Therefore, the space set up by (18a) from *Takeshi*'s Viewpoint and the space set up

by (18b) from the narrator's Viewpoint are also blended and, as a result, (17a), which reflects the blending of syntactic structures of (18a) and (18b) is formed :

(18) a. Boku $_i$ wa [Ai ga jibun $_i$ wo nikunde iru koto wo shitte] kanashii.
I-top. Ai-sub. self-obj. hating is that know sad
I $_i$ am sad to know that Ai hates me $_i$.
b. Takeshi $_i$ wa [Ai ga jibun $_i$ wo nikunde iru koto wo shitte] kanashi soo da.
Takeshi-top. Ai-sub. self-obj. hating is that know sad it seems to me
It seems to me that Takeshi $_i$ is sad to know that Ai hates him $_i$.

Outside of narratives, a speaker is not normally omniscient and thus cannot identify himself with *Takeshi* sufficiently to know *Takeshi*'s internal feelings or states. Since it is impossible for the speaker to have perfect knowledge of others' internal feelings or states, (17a) is unacceptable except in narrative. It can of course be made acceptable by the insertion of evidential or inferential markers, as shown in (17b). As we have observed above, an exception of the speaker's total identification with a participant in an non-narrative context is the example (14)(=(12) =(7)), the case where the speaker assigns his highest empathy to his in-group member participant in regard to the giving of a thing from a third person to the participant.

To sum up, there are at least two cases, that is, the case in (14)(=(12) =(7)) and the case in (17a), in which the highest degree of empathy, thus total identification is involved, and therefore, I argue, a blended Viewpoint is conceptually constructed.

These blending phenomena thus indicate that the use of *jibun* is not motivated by the highest degree of empathy. Instead, its use is motivated by the mental transfer of the speaker's Viewpoint, a transfer triggered by a high degree (as opposed to the highest degree) of the speaker's empathy.

Of course, it could be claimed that in examples such as (14)(=(12) =(7)) and (17a), there isn't a blend but simply the occurrence of two unblended Viewpoints. But how could such sentences be acceptable in any language? If such sentences were possible, then indirect speech sentences such as (19a) with the reading that *Nick* and *I* are coreferential, and sentences with an embedded clause such as (19b) with the reading that *Takeshi* and *boku* are coreferential would also be acceptable :

(19) a. *Nick $_i$ said that I $_i$ would win the game.
b. *Takeshi $_i$ wa boku $_i$ ga katsu to omotta.
Takeshi-top. I-sub. win that thought
*Takeshi $_i$ thought that I $_i$ would win.

But this is not the case. Therefore, the examples in which two Viewpoints are concerned are limited to cases such as (14)(=(12) =(7)) and (17a) above, in which two Viewpoints are blended, and cases like (20 a) and (20b), in which the Viewpoint shifts :

(20) a. "Boku $_i$ wa katsu" Takeshi $_i$ wa itta.
I-top. win Takeshi-top. said
Takeshi $_i$ said, "I $_i$ will win".
b. Takeshi $_i$ wa kuyanda : Ore $_i$ wa nante baka nanda!
Takeshi-top. regretted I-top. what a fool
Takeshi $_i$ thought, "What a fool I $_i$ am!"

(20a) is an example of direct speech and (20b) is an example of direct representation of *Takeshi*'s thoughts.

It follows that only the speaker's Viewpoint is reflected in sentences regardless of whether they are simplex, complex or indirect speech sentences. As mentioned above, exceptions are cases of Viewpoint blending and shift.

3. *jibun* sentences and reference-point ability

What cognitive abilities motivate the use of *jibun* in sentences? This section will focus attention to this question.

Let us consider example (21) :

(21) Takeshi $_i$ wa tora ga jibun $_i$ ni mukatte hashitte kita node naki hajimeta.
Takeshi-top. tiger-sub. self-dat. toward came running because crying started
Takeshi $_i$ started crying because the tiger ran toward him $_i$.

When the speaker utters this sentence, he transfers his Viewpoint to the locus of *Takeshi*'s Viewpoint and the *jibun* reflects this mental transfer. Thus, in (21), only the speaker's Viewpoint, not *Takeshi*'s, is reflected. In uttering such a sentence, the speaker doesn't need to locate himself physically where *Takeshi* stands. All he needs to do is exercise mental rotation to describe the situation from *Takeshi*'s Viewpoint position.

The process of the speaker's construal of the event represented in (21) can be schematized as in Figure 9 :

The important point to note is that this process is exactly the same as the process observed in reference-point construction (Langacker 1993 : 6) schematized as in Figure 10 :

In Figure 10, C, R and T stand for the conceptualizer, a reference point and a target respectively. D is a dominion of the target restricted by the reference point. The dotted line arrows show the path of mental contact of the conceptualizer. The path goes from C to T via R.

In Figure 9, the speaker, as a conceptualizer, mentally transfers his or her Viewpoint to the reference point, i.e., Takeshi's Viewpoint locus and describes the target by mental rotation.

I believe that both mental transfer of our Viewpoint and mental rotation are our basic cognitive abilities. Remember we exercised these abilities as we solved a math problem like the following long time ago. Take a look at the shape in Figure 11. And the



Figure 9



Figure 10



Figure 11

question was something like : What does the shape in Figure 11 look like from right above? Since we can use the mental transfer and mental rotation, we are able to tell that the answer is a rectangle without any difficulty.

Let us go back to example (21). To describe the same situation represented by (21), the speaker could also utter (22). But in (22), he does not transfer his Viewpoint and thus he doesn't use mental rotation :

(22) Takeshi $_i$ wa tora ga kare $_i$ ni mukatte hashitte itta node naki hajimeta.
Takeshi-top. tiger-sub. him-dat. toward went running because crying started
Takeshi $_i$ started crying because the tiger ran toward him $_i$.

It is worth noting that the verbs of motion *kita* (came) and *itta* (went) are used as supporting verbs in (21) and (22) respectively. It follows from the position of the speaker's Viewpoint and the direction in which the tiger runs that their use is quite natural. The process of the speaker's construal of the event represented in (22) can be schematized as in Figure 12. We might feel that when we read (21), we understand the situation not through the speaker's Viewpoint but through *Takeshi*'s Viewpoint. But it is not the case. As discussed above, if the situation were construed and described through *Takeshi*'s Viewpoint, then a shift in Viewpoint from the speaker to *Takeshi* would result. However, such a shift results in an ungrammatical sentence (23) since the tiger's running toward *Takeshi* is represented as in (24) through *Takeshi*'s Viewpoint :

(23) *Takeshi $_i$ wa tora ga boku $_i$ ni mukatte hashitte kita node naki hajimeta.
Takeshi-top. tiger-sub. me-dat. toward came running because crying started
*Takeshi $_i$ started crying because the tiger ran toward me $_i$.

(24) Tora ga boku ni mukatte hashitte kita.
tiger-sub. me-dat. toward came running
The tiger ran toward me.

It follows that in (21), we view by mental rotation the situation in which the tiger runs toward *Takeshi* through the speaker's Viewpoint mentally transferred to *Takeshi*'s Viewpoint locus.

It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that the process of the use of *jibun* is nothing



Figure 12

but the reflection of a basic human cognitive ability, reference-point ability, which involves the Viewpoint's mental transfer and mental rotation.

4. Conclusion

In this study, I have argued that the use of Japanese reflexive *jibun* is motivated by the mental transfer of the speaker's Viewpoint to the Viewpoint locus of a participant and the mental rotation, and that the mental transfer is caused by a high degree (as opposed to the highest degree) of the speaker's empathy with the participant. To prove the validity of my argument, I have shown :

(i) The acceptability of examples not accounted for in Kuno's theory can be explained easily by proposing that the speaker's/narrator's highest degree of empathy motivates the blending of the two Viewpoints.
(ii) The well-formedness or the opposite of sentences with the verbs of giving *kureru* and *yaru* can be explained using a unified notion of Viewpoint, if we stipulate centripetal property of the verbs in relation to the locus of the speaker's Viewpoint.

It is concluded that linguistic phenomena related to reflexive *jibun* reflects our reference-point ability and that they can be reasonably and revealingly analyzed if we utilize the notion of Viewpoint and its functions in discourse.

A Note

(1) I will use the notion of Viewpoint and its functions within Mental Space Theory.

Mental Space Theory (1977) views linguistic forms as a kind of recipe that enables speakers and hearers to construct meaning. In this view, the full meaning of a given linguistic expression is not in the expression itself but is constructed fully by its potential to elicit cognitive domains or spaces, and mappings across domains, together with contexts in the discourse, social and cultural background knowledge, and inference and other reasoning processes.

Cutrer (1994) and Fauconnier (1997) posit four conceptual discourse primitives which are crucial to the ongoing process of discourse interpretation. The four primitives are Base, Focus, Event and Viewpoint. These primitives are assigned to the discourse spaces. Roughly speaking, the Base is a starting point for the cognitive construction. The Focus is assigned to a space upon which attention is currently focused. The Event corresponds to the time of the event or state being considered. The Viewpoint is assigned to a space from which other spaces are currently being built or accessed. It is with the Viewpoint that we will be most concerned later in this paper.

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